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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/037,341	01/04/2002	David Baltimore	75723-ZA/IPW/CJG	6591
23432 7590 06/22/2010 COOPER & DUNHAM, LLP 30 Rockefeller Plaza 20th Floor NEW YORK, NY 10112				
EXAMINER HIBBERT, CATHERINE S				
ART UNIT		PAPER NUMBER		
1636				
MAIL DATE		DELIVERY MODE		
06/22/2010		PAPER		

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

10/037,341

Applicant(s)

BALTIMORE ET AL.

Examiner

CATHERINE HIBBERT

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-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --
Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 29 March 2010.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 90 and 91 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 90-91 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) ☐ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☒ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SF/IC)
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date: _____
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application
- 6) ☐ Other: _____
- Paper No(s)/Mail Date 5/11/2009, 9/24/2009, 11/9/2009, and 1/26/2010

Detailed Action

Applicants' Amendment to the Claims filed 29 March 2010 is received and entered. Claims 1-89 are cancelled. Claims 90 and 91 are pending and under examination in this action.

Any rejections/objections not repeated in this Office Action is withdrawn.

Information Disclosure Statement

The Supplemental Information Disclosure Statements, submitted on 5/11/2009, 9/24/2009, 11/9/2009, and 1/26/2010, have been considered by the examiner.

Response to Amendment

Obviousness Type Double Patenting Rejections

The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., *In re Berg*, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with this application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement.

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

Claims 90-91 STAND rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-5, 9-17, 20-63, 88-94, 96-143, 146-176 and 192-203 of U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because of reasons of record in the previous Office Action and for reasons outlined below. Claim 91 is obvious in that claims in the '516 patent (see in particular claim 9) recite methods for reducing expression in human cell of a gene which has been induced by an extracellular influence that activates NF- κ B. The specification of the '516 patent specifically discloses extracellular polypeptides as embodiments of the extracellular influences which activate NF- κ B and hence said embodiment would have been obvious to the ordinary skilled artisan.

It is noted for the record that Claims 80, 95, 144, and 145 (which depend from Claims 7-9 and 14) of the '516 patent were held to be unpatentable in the recent court decision *Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.* Appeal from the US District Court for the District of MA (Decided 3 April 2009), and that these claims are included in the basis for the ODP.

Applicants have responded to this rejection (see Applicants Remarks, filed 9 November 2009) by indicating that they will file a Terminal Disclaimer upon indication of allowable subject matter should the allowable subject matter so require.

The rejection will therefore be maintained.

Claims 90-91 stand provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 89 of copending Application No. 10/037,415. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because of reasons of record in the previous Office Action and for reasons outlined below.

Instant claim 90 recites the same method as recited in the '415 application but is broader in reciting any external influence rather than an extracellular polypeptide. The '415 claim would anticipate the instant claim 90. With regard to instant claim 91, both the instant claim and claim 89 of the '415 application recite reducing expression of a gene which has been induced by an extracellular polypeptide that activates NF- κ B. The claims differ in that the '415 claim is narrower in scope in reciting a signal that induces expression of the gene from the plasma membrane of the cell to the nucleus of the cell while the instant claim 91 broadly recites any signal that induces expression of the gene. The instant claim 91 would therefore anticipate claim 89 of the '415 application.

This is a provisional obviousness-type double patenting rejection because the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

Applicants' response is to state that "the current rejection is provisional as the cited application is not patented or allowed" and thus Applicants "defer discussion of the provisional rejection until the double patenting rejections are the only rejections remaining in the present application. M.P.E.P. §804(I) (B)".

Applicants statement is acknowledged and the rejection is maintained.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 90 and 91 STAND rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

Applicants' arguments have been fully considered but are respectfully not found persuasive for reasons of record and presented herein.

Applicants response (see Applicants' Remarks filed 9 November 2009) is to traverse the rejection. The Applicants argue that the ARIAD decision has been vacated and further argue that '[s]ince the ARIAD decision relied upon by the Examiner has been vacated, Applicants respectfully submit that the rejection of the pending claims based on the decision has been rendered moot'.

Applicants' arguments have been carefully considered but are respectfully not found persuasive for reasons of record and presented herein because the *en Banc* court decision *Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co* has upheld the following reasoning for the written description rejection.

It is noted that in the decision *Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.* Appeal from the US District Court for the District of MA (Decided 3 April 2009), Claims 80, 95, 144,

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and 145 (which depend from Claims 7-9 and 14) of U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 (hereafter the '516 patent) were held to be unpatentable for failing to comply with the written description requirement. The court case stated that:

The written description requirement, "serves both to satisfy the inventor's obligation to disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the patent is based, and to demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed." Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The requirement "serves a teaching function, as a quid pro quo in which the public is given meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period of time." Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121 (1853) (explaining that a patentee "can lawfully claim only what he has invented and described, and if he claims more his patent is void"); Reiffen v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1343, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The purpose of [the written description requirement] is to ensure that the scope of the right to exclude . . . does not overreach the scope of the inventor's contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.").

"To satisfy the written description requirement, 'the applicant does not have to utilize any particular form of disclosure to describe the subject matter claimed, but the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that he or she invented what is claimed.'" Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). "In other words, the applicant must 'convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention,' and demonstrate that by disclosure in the specification of the patent." Id. (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Such disclosure need not recite the claimed invention *in haec verba*, but it must do more than merely disclose that which would render the claimed invention obvious. Rochester, 358 F.3d at 923; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that § 112, ¶1 "requires that the written description actually or inherently disclose the claim element").

"Whether the written description requirement is satisfied is a fact-based inquiry that will depend on the nature of the claimed invention and the knowledge of one skilled in the art at the time an invention is made and a patent application is filed." Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1122 (citing Enzo, 323 F.3d at 963). The written description requirement is not satisfied by "[t]he appearance of mere indistinct words in a specification or a claim, even an original claim. . . . A description of what a material does, rather than of what it is, usually does not suffice." Enzo, 323 F.3d at 968 (citing

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Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568); see Rochester, 358 F.3d at 926 (“[G]eneralized language may not suffice if it does not convey the detailed identity of an invention.”).

The same is true for both process claims and composition claims. Rochester, 358 F.3d at 926 (“Regardless whether a compound is claimed per se or a method is claimed that entails the use of the compound, the inventor cannot lay claim to that subject matter unless he can provide a description of the compound sufficient to distinguish infringing compounds from non-infringing compounds, or infringing methods from non-infringing methods.”). Where the specification provides only constructive examples in lieu of working examples, it must still “describe the claimed subject matter in terms that establish that the applicant was in possession of the claimed invention, including all of the elements and limitations.” Id. (citing Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

Of course, what is adequate depends upon the context of the claimed invention. See Capon, 418 F.3d at 1358 (“The written description requirement must be applied in the context of the particular invention and state of the knowledge.”). We have articulated a variety of factors to evaluate the adequacy of the disclosure supporting “generic claims to biological subject matter.” Id. at 1359. These factors include “the existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, [and] the predictability of the aspect at issue.” Id.

The *Ariad* decision sets forth factors and criteria for determining written description. Because the pertinent claims of the '516 patent are very similar to the instant claims 90 and 91 (see ODP rejection above), and because the instant application 10/037,415 is a CONTINUATION of the '516 patent, the relevant criteria used for determining lack of written description for the '516 patent will be used to compare the instant claims 90 and 91 and applied accordingly. The instant application fails to meet the criteria set forth by the *Ariad* decision in at least the following ways as shown in the Table below:

Current Claim	Ariad Claims	<i>Ariad v. Lilly</i> decision factors/criterion	Reasoning as to why current claim does not meet criteria
90, 91	80,95	Describes function but not what the composition is	The instant claim only defines the function

	144,145		
		<p>A vague functional description and an invitation for further research does not constitute written disclosure</p>	<p>The instantly claimed methods comprising the single step of reducing NF-κB activity is not supported by written description because the specification of the '516 patent fails to adequately disclose how the claimed reduction of NF-κB activity is achieved. The specification of the '516 patent as does the current application specification only hypothesizes three classes of molecules potentially capable of reducing NF-κB activity: specific inhibitors, dominantly interfering molecules, and decoy molecules. However, this disclosure amounts to little more than a research plan, and does not satisfy the patentee's quid pro quo as described in <u>Rochester</u>.</p> <p>In <u>Rochester</u>, very similar method claims were held invalid for lack of written description. <u>Id.</u> (holding patent invalid because "Rochester did not present any evidence that the ordinarily skilled artisan would be able to identify any compound based on [the specification's] vague functional description"); see also <u>Fiers v. Revel</u>, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding a claim to a genus of DNA molecules not supported by written description of a method for</p>

		obtaining the molecules); cf. <u>Eli Lilly</u> , 119 F.3d at 1567–68 (holding claims to a broad genus of genetic material invalid because the specification disclosed only one particular species). Ariad attempts to categorically distinguish <u>Rochester</u> , <u>Fiers</u> , and <u>Eli Lilly</u> , because in those cases, the claims explicitly included the non-described compositions.
	Regardless of whether the claims recite a compound, the specification still must describe some way of performing the claimed methods. In the instant case, the specification suggests only the use of the three classes of molecules to achieve NF-κB reduction. Thus, to satisfy the written description requirement for the instant claims, the specification must demonstrate that Applicant possessed the claimed methods by sufficiently disclosing molecules capable of reducing NF-κB activity so as to “satisfy the inventor’s obligation to disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the patent is based, and to demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed.” <u>Capon</u> , 418 F.3d at 1357.	<p>In accordance with <u>Rochester</u>, the ‘516 patent fails to adequately describe the claimed methods for reducing NF-κB activity, including adequate description of the three types of molecules necessary to perform the methods. The specification of the ‘516 patent hypothesizes three classes of molecules potentially capable of reducing NF-κB activity: specific inhibitors, dominantly interfering molecules, and decoy molecules.</p> <p>However, the example of a specific inhibitor given in the specification is I-κB, a naturally occurring molecule whose function is to hold NF-κB in an inactive state until the cell receives certain external influences. However, the Figure 43 which discloses important structural information regarding the sequence of DNA that encodes I-κB has been cancelled by Applicants from</p>

			the instant specification. In addition, the specification does not provide sufficient written description for the dominantly interfering molecules. In addition, although the specification does provide specific examples of decoy molecules (DNA oligonucleotides) the specification does not adequately describe using those molecules to reduce NF-kB activity.
		Because written description is determined as of the filing date-- April 21, 1989 in the Ariad case and in the instant case,--evidence of what one of ordinary skill in the art knew in 1990 or 1991 cannot provide substantial evidence to support adequate written description. <u>See Vas-Cath</u> , 935 F.2d at 1563-64 (holding that a written description analysis occurs "as of the filing date sought").	Evidence of what one of ordinary skill in the art knew in 1990 or 1991 cannot provide substantial evidence to support adequate written description. <u>See Vas-Cath</u> , 935 F.2d at 1563-64 (holding that a written description analysis occurs "as of the filing date sought").
		Predictability	Ariad explains that developing the subject matter of the '516 patent "required years of hard work, great skill, and extraordinary creativity--so much so that the inventors first needed to discover, give names to, and describe previously unknown cellular components as a necessary predicate for their inventions." Lilly offered the undisputed expert testimony of David Latchman that the field of the invention was particularly unpredictable. Thus, this

			invention was made in a new and unpredictable field where the existing knowledge and prior art was scant. <u>See Capon</u> , 418 F.3d at 1359.
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The description requirement of the patent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention. See *In re Wilder*, 736, F.2d 1516, 1521, 222 USPQ 369, 372-73 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming rejection because the specification does "little more than outlin[e] goals appellants hope the claimed invention achieves and the problems the invention will hopefully ameliorate.") Accordingly, it is deemed that the specification fails to provide adequate written description for the genus of the claims and does not reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the entire scope of the claimed invention.

Conclusion

No claims are allowed.

THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any

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extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to CATHERINE HIBBERT, whose telephone number is (571)270-3053. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Thursday from 8:00 AM to 5:30 PM. The examiner can also be reached on alternate Fridays.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Christopher Low, Ph.D., can be reached on (571) 272-0739. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

/NANCY VOGEL/

Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1636

Catherine Sanders Hibbert
Examiner AU1636